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sophists apparently infiltrated gymnasia in the beginning of the classical era and remained there until late antiquity.
To be sure, the sophists did not teach exclusively at gymnasia. Private houses also served as common meeting spots for sophistic exchanges. As R. E. Wycherly points out, "a Greek philosophical school was essentially a specialized extension of the Hellenic household" (155). It was very common indeed for citizens to play host to itinerant scholars, as we see in many of Plato's dialogues. In the Phaedrus, for example, the opening shows Phaedrus reporting to Socrates that he has just come from the house of Epicrates, where Phaedrus, Epicrates, and Lysias discoursed on the subject of eros. Isocrates set up a school in his own house, as did Kallias (Wycherly 155ff). While Isocrates taught in a house, he nevertheless spent some time in local athletic facilities, as he is said to have died in 3 3 8/37 in an Athenian palaestra owned by a man named Hippocrates (Kyle 144; Plutarch, "Lives of the Ten Orators").
Other sophists wandered about town, often imparting their wisdom in the agora.
Xenophon tells how the sophist Euthydemus used a saddler's shop near the agora as a place for sharing his art of discourse (Memorabilia 4.2.1). In Plato's Lesser Hippias, Socrates says to Hippias that he has heard him making a display of his wisdom "in the agora by the tables" (368b). Most-if not all-sophists passed through the city's gymnasia at some point.
For all practical purposes, the gymnasium, a sprawling space with numerous rooms inhabited by young men, was an ideal place for sophists to cultivate a following. For one thing, as Susan Jarratt has observed, the sophists were the Athenian version of "public intellectuals" (98), so it makes sense that they would visit the public gymnasia, since the sites were already an integral part of the daily practices of most free Athenian men. But perhaps more importantly, these locations were frequented by youths seeking to cultivate a citizen ethos. As Frederick Beck points out, "palaestrae and gymnasia were the only places of instruction frequented at all by boys in their middle and late teens" (131). As locations of physical training-young boys learned and practiced running, jumping, wrestling, and boxing, for startersthe gymnasia were already important sites for the production of citizen subjects, and moreover, the production took place in a decidedly corporeal style. From this spatial intermingling of practices there emerged a curious syncretism between athletics and rhetoric, a particular crossover in pedagogical practices and learning styles, a crossover that contributed to the development of rhetoric as a bodily art: an art learned, practiced, and performed by and with the body as well as the mind. What follows will continue to treat the two arts syncretically-by thinking them together-and in this manner will delineate features of the sophists' pedagogy, refigure a portion of rhetoric's history, and consider possible implications such a history may hold for contemporary pedagogy.
For all practical purposes, the gymnasium, a sprawling space with numerous rooms inhabited by young men, was an ideal place for sophists to cultivate a following. For one thing, as Susan Jarratt has observed, the sophists were the Athenian version of "public intellectuals" (98), so it makes sense that they would visit the public gymnasia, since the sites were already an integral part of the daily practices of most free Athenian men. But perhaps more importantly, these locations were frequented by youths seeking to cultivate a citizen ethos. As Frederick Beck points out, "palaestrae and gymnasia were the only places of instruction frequented at all by boys in their middle and late teens" (131). As locations of physical training-young boys learned and practiced running, jumping, wrestling, and boxing, for startersthe gymnasia were already important sites for the production of citizen subjects, and moreover, the production took place in a decidedly corporeal style. From this spatial intermingling of practices there emerged a curious syncretism between athletics and rhetoric, a particular crossover in pedagogical practices and learning styles, a crossover that contributed to the development of rhetoric as a bodily art: an art learned, practiced, and performed by and with the body as well as the mind. What follows will continue to treat the two arts syncretically-by thinking them together-and in this manner will delineate features of the sophists' pedagogy, refigure a portion of rhetoric's history, and consider possible implications such a history may hold for contemporary pedagogy. athletes would rehearse fundamental movements, be they throwing form, an approach or hold, or jab steps.
Given the proximity of athletic and rhetorical training, as well as the noisiness ofauloi-their shrill sounds approximate those produced by modern-day bagpipesit is also likely that music flowed into recitations and sophistic lectures, producing an awareness of-indeed, facilitating-the rhythmic, tonic quality of speeches. As Kenneth J. Freeman points out, the aulos did not merely provide background noise, but rather played an integral role in training, as the instrument was used "in order that good time might be preserved in the various movements" (128). Music's role in the gymnasium, then, was to introduce a rhythm, to provide a tempo for the practice and production of bodily movements. In short, music established a rhythm through the cyclical repetition of patterns, and this rhythm was replicated in the bodily movements of those in training.
As with most topics, Aristotle was the first to delineate the logic behind music in education.3 For Aristotle, the intrinsic qualities of certain rhythms and modes cannot be separated from their effects on a person, so that some music is useful for relaxation, some for education, some for pleasure, and some for catharsis (Politics 8.
5.4-7.8). After parsing the various effects of music, Aristotle moves to what is, at least for him, the more interesting line of inquiry-the way in which music works directly on character (ethos) and soul (psyche):
But it is clear that we are affected in a certain manner, both by many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus; for these admittedly make our souls enthusiastic, and enthusiasm is an affection of the character of the soul. And moreover everybody when listening to imitations (mimeseon) is thrown into a corresponding state of feeling, even apart from the rhythms and tunes themselves. (8.5.5-6) For Aristotle, the aurality of music differs from other mimetic arts, in that it more powerfully conveys ethos than those arts depending on other senses for perception. He writes that "other objects of sensation contain no representation of character, for example, the objects of touch and taste" (1340a.29-30). He then follows this with a long parenthetical comment on visual art, where he says such works "are not representations of character but rather the forms and colors produced are mere indications of character" (13 50a.3 5). Noteworthy, however, is the way in which pieces of music "actually contain in themselves imitations of character" (mimemata t6n ethon), and later, he discusses different kinds of rhythms as possessing (echousi) more stable (stasimnoteron) or mobile (kinetikon) character (1340b.9). In other words, music, with its sonorous, seductive movements, most closely approximates human ethos, as Aristotle writes "we seem to have a certain kinship (suggeneia) with tunes and rhythms" (1340b.17-18).
Aristotle draws his conceptions of musical ethos from the sophist Damon, a legendary music teacher who studied with the sophist Prodicus. According to a athletes would rehearse fundamental movements, be they throwing form, an approach or hold, or jab steps. Given the proximity of athletic and rhetorical training, as well as the noisiness ofauloi-their shrill sounds approximate those produced by modern-day bagpipesit is also likely that music flowed into recitations and sophistic lectures, producing an awareness of-indeed, facilitating-the rhythmic, tonic quality of speeches. As Kenneth J. Freeman points out, the aulos did not merely provide background noise, but rather played an integral role in training, as the instrument was used "in order that good time might be preserved in the various movements" (128). Music's role in the gymnasium, then, was to introduce a rhythm, to provide a tempo for the practice and production of bodily movements. In short, music established a rhythm through the cyclical repetition of patterns, and this rhythm was replicated in the bodily movements of those in training.
As with most topics, Aristotle was the first to delineate the logic behind music in education.3 For Aristotle, the intrinsic qualities of certain rhythms and modes cannot be separated from their effects on a person, so that some music is useful for relaxation, some for education, some for pleasure, and some for catharsis (Politics 8.5.4-7.8). After parsing the various effects of music, Aristotle moves to what is, at least for him, the more interesting line of inquiry-the way in which music works directly on character (ethos) and soul (psyche):
Aristotle draws his conceptions of musical ethos from the sophist Damon, a legendary music teacher who studied with the sophist Prodicus. According to a training as a part of a network of practices. Specifically, as a molder of ethos, music served as an educational tool for the ancients and was hence a facilitator of athletic and rhetorical training, insofar as it helped the physical trainers, as Isocrates observes, to "set [the students] at exercises." Attention to music's role in ancient education, therefore, brings to light the mimetic and repetitive aspects of training, aspects that emphasize education as a bodily practice. The Greek word for rhythm, rhythmos, may be used to indicate "any regular recurring motion," or "measured motion or time." The motion-time complex of meanings then folds into disposition, as rhythmos may also mean "symmetry," "state or condition, temper, disposition," "form, shape of a thing," "manner" (Liddell and Scott 1576 herefore it is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the character of the soul" (1340b). What Aristotle has located in music is an almost inexplicable kind of transformative capacity. Following the line of thinking expounded by Damon, and also by the character Protagoras in Plato's dialogue, whereby the rhythms and scales literally "move in" to the soul (Protagoras 326B), Aristotle and Plato view music as an almost mystical mode of provoking particular dispositions. In other words, music's capacity to transmit dispositions falls outside of the category of reasoned, conscious learning, as rhythms and modes invade the soul, and at times, excite the body to movement. As J. G. Warry describes it, learning from music takes place through the production of tension or relaxation at muscular and nervous levels and is thereby more direct, more powerful (109). It is precisely because of music's direct, bodily delivery, its capacity for dispositional transformation, according to Aristotle, that music must be used for education, and used carefully. Damon, Aristotle, and Plato therefore all mark music as an ethos delivery system, an affective educative mechanism.
Since ancient texts have a good deal to say about music in education, and, moreover, what they do say connects explicitly with athletic and rhetorical training methods and dynamics, music provides a useful context in which to consider rhetorical training as a part of a network of practices. Specifically, as a molder of ethos, music served as an educational tool for the ancients and was hence a facilitator of athletic and rhetorical training, insofar as it helped the physical trainers, as Isocrates observes, to "set [the students] at exercises." Attention to music's role in ancient education, therefore, brings to light the mimetic and repetitive aspects of training, aspects that emphasize education as a bodily practice.
The Greek word for rhythm, rhythmos, may be used to indicate "any regular recurring motion," or "measured motion or time." The motion-time complex of meanings then folds into disposition, as rhythmos may also mean "symmetry," "state or condition, temper, disposition," "form, shape of a thing," "manner" (Liddell and Scott 1576 herefore it is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the character of the soul" (1340b). What Aristotle has located in music is an almost inexplicable kind of transformative capacity. Following the line of thinking expounded by Damon, and also by the character Protagoras in Plato's dialogue, whereby the rhythms and scales literally "move in" to the soul (Protagoras 326B), Aristotle and Plato view music as an almost mystical mode of provoking particular dispositions. In other words, music's capacity to transmit dispositions falls outside of the category of reasoned, conscious learning, as rhythms and modes invade the soul, and at times, excite the body to movement. As J. G. Warry describes it, learning from music takes place through the production of tension or relaxation at muscular and nervous levels and is thereby more direct, more powerful (109). It is precisely because of music's direct, bodily delivery, its capacity for dispositional transformation, according to Aristotle, that music must be used for education, and used carefully. Damon, Aristotle, and Plato therefore all mark music as an ethos delivery system, an affective educative mechanism.
The Greek word for rhythm, rhythmos, may be used to indicate "any regular recurring motion," or "measured motion or time." The motion-time complex of meanings then folds into disposition, as rhythmos may also mean "symmetry," "state or condition, temper, disposition," "form, shape of a thing," "manner" ( adapted). The three nouns here-epimeleias, spoudas, and suntonias, are almost synonymous in their force of intensity. Epimeleias, as noted above, suggests an intense engagement with or even a "pursuit" of an object so as to take charge of it. The word also has forces of "curator" or "commissioner" (LS 1645), linking such diligent care to ownership. Spoudas comes from the word for speed (spoude), and suggests an intensity of pace, a zealous exertion or earnestness in one's studies. In some cases, it is also used to mean "disputation," and thus has affiliations with rhetoric's agon. Similarly, suntonias suggests a kind of impetuous vehemence, and offers a way of describing intensity through musical language, where it means "high-pitched" or "acute" (LS 1728). aforgetting of directives. In other words, as rhythm is achieved, knowledge of fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious, and habituation ensues. Importantly, though, along with rhythm, this style of teaching emphasizes response as well, as the exercises are performed with an opponent, the "him" of the passage. "You get under his hold; you step through, engage." "You throw him off with your left hand." Instructed in pairs together (Gardiner 374), wrestlers in training went through their motions, executing the drill techniques described in the papyrus fragment above. In this way, responsiveness becomes incorporated in the rhythm, as the opponent's moves must be taken into account, reacted to, and countered, all in the blink of an eye. The command plexon is noteworthy here, as it can mean "intertwine," "engage," or, as Michael Poliakoff suggests, "fight it out" (52-53). Hence, the opponent's moves and the attention to specificity they require introduce difference to the repetition, demanding a new move in between each of the throwing directives. Stylistically, the manual captures the difference between repetitions, demanding and producing its own kind of rhythmic response. adapted). The three nouns here-epimeleias, spoudas, and suntonias, are almost synonymous in their force of intensity. Epimeleias, as noted above, suggests an intense engagement with or even a "pursuit" of an object so as to take charge of it. The word also has forces of "curator" or "commissioner" (LS 1645), linking such diligent care to ownership. Spoudas comes from the word for speed (spoude), and suggests an intensity of pace, a zealous exertion or earnestness in one's studies. In some cases, it is also used to mean "disputation," and thus has affiliations with rhetoric's agon. Similarly, suntonias suggests a kind of impetuous vehemence, and offers a way of describing intensity through musical language, where it means "high-pitched" or "acute" (LS 1728). aforgetting of directives. In other words, as rhythm is achieved, knowledge of fundamentals becomes bodily rather than conscious, and habituation ensues. Importantly, though, along with rhythm, this style of teaching emphasizes response as well, as the exercises are performed with an opponent, the "him" of the passage. "You get under his hold; you step through, engage." "You throw him off with your left hand." Instructed in pairs together (Gardiner 374), wrestlers in training went through their motions, executing the drill techniques described in the papyrus fragment above. In this way, responsiveness becomes incorporated in the rhythm, as the opponent's moves must be taken into account, reacted to, and countered, all in the blink of an eye. The command plexon is noteworthy here, as it can mean "intertwine," "engage," or, as Michael Poliakoff suggests, "fight it out" (52-53). Hence, the opponent's moves and the attention to specificity they require introduce difference to the repetition, demanding a new move in between each of the throwing directives. Stylistically, the manual captures the difference between repetitions, demanding and producing its own kind of rhythmic response. adapted). The three nouns here-epimeleias, spoudas, and suntonias, are almost synonymous in their force of intensity. Epimeleias, as noted above, suggests an intense engagement with or even a "pursuit" of an object so as to take charge of it. The word also has forces of "curator" or "commissioner" (LS 1645), linking such diligent care to ownership. Spoudas comes from the word for speed (spoude), and suggests an intensity of pace, a zealous exertion or earnestness in one's studies. In some cases, it is also used to mean "disputation," and thus has affiliations with rhetoric's agon. Similarly, suntonias suggests a kind of impetuous vehemence, and offers a way of describing intensity through musical language, where it means "high-pitched" or "acute" (LS 1728).
The learning dynamic described by Aristotle approximates an Empedoclean fragment in which Empedocles exhorts Pausanias to encounter his teachings with a certain intensity:
If you push them (ereisas) firmly under your crowded thoughts (prapidessin), and contemplate (meleteisin) them favorably with unsullied and constant attention, assuredly all these will be with you through life, and you will gain much else from them, for of themselves they will cause each thing to grow into the character (auta gar auxei taut' eis ethos hkaston), according to the nature ( This passage is rich with commentary about how education works as character sculpting. Here, Empedocles encourages Pausanias to engage his teachings with a particular intensity, as indicated by the verb ereisas, which has the force of "push," "thrust," and once again, "struggle." Further, Empedocles is very specific about where the struggle occurs: "under your crowded thoughts (prapidessin)." Prapidessin marks a spot just under the diaphragm, in the midriff area. This area was deemed the somatic seat of intellect, the "mental powers and affections" that helped induce understanding. Once again, the body plays an important role in Greek thinking on habit production. Just as we see with musical rhythms, bodily habits emerge from an opening up of the body for alliance formation. In other words, Empedocles holds that cunning intelligence (metis) emerges from the encounter with the immediate (fr. 106), and the encounter is more than perception-mind meets (and masters) matter-instead, it is a bodily production, a mutually constitutive struggle among bodies and surrounding forces. As Aristotle's and Empedocles's passages suggest, the struggle habit formation entails is intensely demanding-even violent (as suggested by bia, "force," "act of violence")-for it requires sustained engagement, or, as Janet Atwill puts it in her consideration of the same passage, "severe discipline of contemplation" (90). In short, this level of engagement requires intensive attention, disciplined, painful, repeated exercise, all forces of melete.
Thus melete becomes the means through which permanent dispositions develop; it is the most effective mode of educational production. When he discusses the disposition (hexis) of self-restraint in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers the relationship between habit, nature, and melete:
Those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Evenus says: "I say practice (meleten) is long-lasting, friend, and moreover with humankind it finally becomes their nature." This passage is rich with commentary about how education works as character sculpting. Here, Empedocles encourages Pausanias to engage his teachings with a particular intensity, as indicated by the verb ereisas, which has the force of "push," "thrust," and once again, "struggle." Further, Empedocles is very specific about where the struggle occurs: "under your crowded thoughts (prapidessin)." Prapidessin marks a spot just under the diaphragm, in the midriff area. This area was deemed the somatic seat of intellect, the "mental powers and affections" that helped induce understanding. Once again, the body plays an important role in Greek thinking on habit production. Just as we see with musical rhythms, bodily habits emerge from an opening up of the body for alliance formation. In other words, Empedocles holds that cunning intelligence (metis) emerges from the encounter with the immediate (fr. 106), and the encounter is more than perception-mind meets (and masters) matter-instead, it is a bodily production, a mutually constitutive struggle among bodies and surrounding forces. As Aristotle's and Empedocles's passages suggest, the struggle habit formation entails is intensely demanding-even violent (as suggested by bia, "force," "act of violence")-for it requires sustained engagement, or, as Janet Atwill puts it in her consideration of the same passage, "severe discipline of contemplation" (90). In short, this level of engagement requires intensive attention, disciplined, painful, repeated exercise, all forces of melete.
Those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Evenus says: "I say practice (meleten) is long-lasting, friend, and moreover with humankind it finally becomes their nature." (7.10.41; 1152a; trans. mine) As Jeffrey Walker points out in his discussion of the above passage, "melete [. . .] is the means of cultivating ethos" (Rhetoric and Poetics 148). And it is the kind of ethos suggested here that makes all the difference. This passage is noteworthy because it suggests that practice produces the very habit of self-control necessary to make oneself capable of training. In other words, education is enabled through one's habit of melete, of a belief in the transformative work of practice.
Training or epimeleias thus occurs through repeated, sustained engagement-a shared trait of athletic and rhetorical training as elaborated by Isocrates in Antidosis. Recall that for Isocrates, athletic and rhetorical training are "parallel and complementary" (182), the means by which "masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable" (182). In other words, these "twin arts" are, for Isocrates, the two fundamental arts for citizen training, because this particular training juncture, Isocrates contends, enables teachers to "advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in the use of their bodies" (185). This mode of teaching thus, in Isocrates's logic, better equips young Athenians to become effective citizens. Effective teachers, therefore, do not separate the two kinds of education, but rather use "similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline" (182): For when they take on pupils, the physical trainers instruct their followers in the postures (ta schemata) that have been invented for bodily contests, while those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures that discourse (logos) employs. When they have made them experienced with these, and they have discussed them with precision, they again exercise the students and habituate them to hard work, and then compel them to combine (suneirein) everything they have learned. Recall that for Isocrates, athletic and rhetorical training are "parallel and complementary" (182), the means by which "masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable" (182). In other words, these "twin arts" are, for Isocrates, the two fundamental arts for citizen training, because this particular training juncture, Isocrates contends, enables teachers to "advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in the use of their bodies" (185). This mode of teaching thus, in Isocrates's logic, better equips young Athenians to become effective citizens. Effective teachers, therefore, do not separate the two kinds of education, but rather use "similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline" (182):
For when they take on pupils, the physical trainers instruct their followers in the postures (ta schemata) that have been invented for bodily contests, while those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures that discourse (logos) employs. When they have made them experienced with these, and they have discussed them with precision, they again exercise the students and habituate them to hard work, and then compel them to combine (suneirein) everything they have learned. Recall that for Isocrates, athletic and rhetorical training are "parallel and complementary" (182), the means by which "masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable" (182). In other words, these "twin arts" are, for Isocrates, the two fundamental arts for citizen training, because this particular training juncture, Isocrates contends, enables teachers to "advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in the use of their bodies" (185). This mode of teaching thus, in Isocrates's logic, better equips young Athenians to become effective citizens. Effective teachers, therefore, do not separate the two kinds of education, but rather use "similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline" (182):
For when they take on pupils, the physical trainers instruct their followers in the postures (ta schemata) that have been invented for bodily contests, while those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures that discourse (logos) employs. When they have made them experienced with these, and they have discussed them with precision, they again exercise the students and habituate them to hard work, and then compel them to combine (suneirein) everything they have learned. Rhythm, repetition, and response bring us to a consideration of time, as a "nowness" pervades repetition and the difference it produces. Throughout Gymnastic, a second-century treatise on sports that harks back to classical times, Philostratus reiterates the importance of using situational encounters to teach kairos, suggesting that a particular hold cannot be learned separately from a situation (an encounter) in which it is used (14.269). The repetition of movements is always produced in relation-to the opponent, to one's shadow, to the javelin, to the rhythmic sounds of the aulos-hence the centrality of kairos, the time of response, of singularity, to sophistic pedagogy. In his Outline of a Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu notes that the sophists, when called upon to systematize their arts, came up against "the right way and the right moment-kairos-to apply the rules, or, as the phrase so aptly goes, to put into practice a repertoire of devices or techniques" (20). "To put into practice" nicely approximates Isocrates's phrasing, as kairos is his concern. As Isocrates contends, no system of knowledge can teach kairotic response; rather such response emerges out of repeated encounters with difference: different opponents, different subject matter, different times and places. Rhythm, repetition, and response bring us to a consideration of time, as a "nowness" pervades repetition and the difference it produces. Throughout Gymnastic, a second-century treatise on sports that harks back to classical times, Philostratus reiterates the importance of using situational encounters to teach kairos, suggesting that a particular hold cannot be learned separately from a situation (an encounter) in which it is used (14.269). The repetition of movements is always produced in relation-to the opponent, to one's shadow, to the javelin, to the rhythmic sounds of the aulos-hence the centrality of kairos, the time of response, of singularity, to sophistic pedagogy. In his Outline of a Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu notes that the sophists, when called upon to systematize their arts, came up against "the right way and the right moment-kairos-to apply the rules, or, as the phrase so aptly goes, to put into practice a repertoire of devices or techniques" (20). "To put into practice" nicely approximates Isocrates's phrasing, as kairos is his concern. As Isocrates contends, no system of knowledge can teach kairotic response; rather such response emerges out of repeated encounters with difference: different opponents, different subject matter, different times and places. If musical rhythm comes to inhabit the body through productive repetition, rhythm also gets inculcated through a kind of mimesis, another critical element in ancient pedagogy, and, as we will see, another way of producing repeated encounters with difference. As we saw earlier, for Aristotle, music is doubly mimetic: its rhythms imitate ethe, and when it invades the body and grips the soul, the connection formed between music and listener produces a second mimesis, as the listener imitates ethical rhythms. Mimesis or imitation was, for most Greeks, a primary mode of learning, as illustrated by Democritus's fragment on the acquisition of technical expertise through observing animals: "We are students of the animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation (kata mimesin)" (Diels and Kranz 68.B.154). In other words, mimetic learning happens through a relation with the other, an observation and repetition of an other's actions and practices-in this case the spider, the swallow, the swan. That imitation was considered a basic part of the pedagogical process in ancient Athens is well known (Beck 268). Democritus's pithy saying puts imitative logic in its most precise form: "One must either be good or imitate a good man" (Diels and Kranz 68.B.39). From very early on, then, Greek poets and philosophers held that learning happens through alliances. In other words, the forces (people, the link between schemata-forms of movement acquired through repetitive habituation-and their use in response to particular situations. Rhythm, repetition, and response bring us to a consideration of time, as a "nowness" pervades repetition and the difference it produces. Throughout Gymnastic, a second-century treatise on sports that harks back to classical times, Philostratus reiterates the importance of using situational encounters to teach kairos, suggesting that a particular hold cannot be learned separately from a situation (an encounter) in which it is used (14.269). The repetition of movements is always produced in relation-to the opponent, to one's shadow, to the javelin, to the rhythmic sounds of the aulos-hence the centrality of kairos, the time of response, of singularity, to sophistic pedagogy. In his Outline of a Theory of Practice, Pierre Bourdieu notes that the sophists, when called upon to systematize their arts, came up against "the right way and the right moment-kairos-to apply the rules, or, as the phrase so aptly goes, to put into practice a repertoire of devices or techniques" (20). "To put into practice" nicely approximates Isocrates's phrasing, as kairos is his concern. As Isocrates contends, no system of knowledge can teach kairotic response; rather such response emerges out of repeated encounters with difference: different opponents, different subject matter, different times and places. If musical rhythm comes to inhabit the body through productive repetition, rhythm also gets inculcated through a kind of mimesis, another critical element in ancient pedagogy, and, as we will see, another way of producing repeated encounters with difference. As we saw earlier, for Aristotle, music is doubly mimetic: its rhythms imitate ethe, and when it invades the body and grips the soul, the connection formed between music and listener produces a second mimesis, as the listener imitates ethical rhythms. Mimesis or imitation was, for most Greeks, a primary mode of learning, as illustrated by Democritus's fragment on the acquisition of technical expertise through observing animals: "We are students of the animals in the most important things: the spider for spinning and mending, the swallow for building, and the songsters, swan and nightingale, for singing, by way of imitation (kata mimesin)" (Diels and Kranz 68.B.154). In other words, mimetic learning happens through a relation with the other, an observation and repetition of an other's actions and practices-in this case the spider, the swallow, the swan. That imitation was considered a basic part of the pedagogical process in ancient Athens is well known (Beck 268). Democritus's pithy saying puts imitative logic in its most precise form: "One must either be good or imitate a good man" (Diels and Kranz 68.B.39). From very early on, then, Greek poets and philosophers held that learning happens through alliances. In other words, the forces (people, music, movements) one subjects oneself to will necessarily shape and reshape body and soul. Take, for example, the following lines from the sixth-century BC poet
Theognis:
It is good to be called to a feast and sit beside a good man who knows all learning-To associate with him (tou suniein) whenever he says something good so that you might learn and go home holding an advantage (kerdos). (563-66; trans. mine)
Here, suniein, a verb meaning to come together, to observe, or to associate with, is the verb form of the noun sunousia, literally "being together," "habitual or constant association," even "sexual intercourse" (Liddell and Scott 1723). Sunousia produces relations, alliances, which in turn occasion mimesis. Another Theognidean fragment helps elaborate the nature of such close association, as he advises his friend and mentee Kyrnos:
Turn (estrephe) to all friends, Kyrnos, a variable habit (poikilon ethos), mingling your disposition (organ) in the manner of each one: now pursue (ephu) one, now move toward (ephepeu) a disposition of another kind; for skill (sophie) is even more powerful (kreisson) than great virtue (megales aretes). (1071-74; trans. mine).
At first glance, Theognis's advice for obtaining skill seems quite easy: Kyrnos need only hang around with smart people. But the remarkable number of active, imperative, movement-based verbs (estrephe, ephu, ephepeu) suggests that Kyrnos's task is far more complex. Here, Theognis tells his young friend to assume an octopus-like (poikilon) ethos, to make himself malleable, to open himself up and move toward skillful dispositions he sees in others. Such active movement enables the alliances necessary for ethos production.
In Areopagiticus, Isocrates once again returns to the mechanics of training practiced by his "ancestors" (43), harking back to the forces that produced the Democritean and Theognidean observations discussed above. The very best of students, Isocrates contends, didn't spend time in gambling houses or with flute girls, "but remained deliberately devoted (epitedeumasin) to those pursuits they had been assigned, admiring and emulating (thaumoazontes kai zelountes) those who excelled in these" (48; my trans.). What Isocrates articulates here is a pedagogy of associationa cultivation of habits and practices by placing oneself in close relation to those who practice the arts one is pursuing; these arts were named earlier in the treatise as horsemanship, athletics, hunting, and philosophy, or study of discourse (45). The terms thaumazonetes and zelountes, yoked together in this passage and translated "admiring" and "emulating," work together to link desire to action. That is, the observing and admiring lead to an active emulating, an attempt to become like the objects of admiration through repetition of their actions. But zelountes conveys more than imitation (mimesis), for its root verb (zeloo), here translated "to emulate," may also be rendered "to vie with." Its connotations, ranging from jealousy and envy to zealous music, movements) one subjects oneself to will necessarily shape and reshape body and soul. Take, for example, the following lines from the sixth-century BC poet
Theognis:
Turn (estrephe) to all friends, Kyrnos, a variable habit (poikilon ethos), mingling your disposition (organ) in the manner of each one: now pursue (ephu) one, now move toward (ephepeu) a disposition of another kind; for skill (sophie) is even more powerful (kreisson) than great virtue (megales aretes). (1071-74; trans. mine).
Theognis:
Turn (estrephe) to all friends, Kyrnos, a variable habit (poikilon ethos), mingling your disposition (organ) in the manner of each one: now pursue (ephu) one, now move toward (ephepeu) a disposition of another kind; for skill (sophie) is even more powerful (kreisson) than great virtue (megales aretes). (1071-74; trans. mine).
In Areopagiticus, Isocrates once again returns to the mechanics of training practiced by his "ancestors" (43), harking back to the forces that produced the Democritean and Theognidean observations discussed above. The very best of students, Isocrates contends, didn't spend time in gambling houses or with flute girls, "but remained deliberately devoted (epitedeumasin) to those pursuits they had been assigned, admiring and emulating (thaumoazontes kai zelountes) those who excelled in these" (48; my trans.). What Isocrates articulates here is a pedagogy of associationa cultivation of habits and practices by placing oneself in close relation to those who practice the arts one is pursuing; these arts were named earlier in the treatise as horsemanship, athletics, hunting, and philosophy, or study of discourse (45). The terms thaumazonetes and zelountes, yoked together in this passage and translated "admiring" and "emulating," work together to link desire to action. That is, the observing and admiring lead to an active emulating, an attempt to become like the objects of admiration through repetition of their actions. But zelountes conveys more than imitation (mimesis), for its root verb (zeloo), here translated "to emulate," may also be rendered "to vie with." Its connotations, ranging from jealousy and envy to zealous admirations, all hold a kind of desire-to "strive after, affect, desire emulously" (Liddell and Scott 755) . The Isocratean passage thus suggests a concomitant coveting of and agonistic striving after qualities embodied in an expert practitioner of the art at hand: repetition cannot be easily separated from response.
Instances of associative pedagogy are evident among the sophistic characters in Plato's dialogues. In Protagoras, for example, archaic literature functions to produce the desire to imitate. The dialogue's phrasing produces literature as a place, a locus into which a youth is sent, as a warrior sent to battle (anagkazousin), and upon entering, he encounters the descriptions and encomia of good men from the past, so "that the boy in envy [zelon] may imitate [mimetai] them and yearn to become [ginesthai] even as they" (326). Again, envy and desire emerge as necessary components of imitation. But that imitation is given aplace-here the literature, for Isocrates the teacher's instructive ecology-a locus the students are to inhabit to the extent that the practices begin to inhabit them, as we see in the case of music when the rhythms and scales quite literally move in (oikeiousthai) to the boys' souls (326b). Here, envy and desire rename the active, impelling forces operating in Theognis's urgings of Kyrnos.
It is Isocrates who articulates precisely the way associative pedagogy fits into other modes of learning, such as mastery of principles, for example. He writes in "Against the Sophists" that in addition to making the principles of oratory available for students, the teacher should "in himself provide such an example of oratory that the students who have taken shape (ektupothentas) under his instruction and are able to imitate (mimesasthai dunamenous) him will, at once, show in their speaking an unsurpassed degree of grace and charm" (18; my trans.). Here the word translated "have taken shape," ektupothentas, comes from ektupos, a term from the art of sculpting meaning "worked in relief' or formed on a model. The word itself marks the kind of imitation suggested by Isocrates's scheme: that which provides a rough form to be followed in the sculpting of the student.
The passive form of the verb is suggestive, too, insofar as it thwarts a notion of a "sculptor" per se; the shape, rather, emerges under the teacher's instruction, or in a particular milieu-that is, out of a relational, associative dynamic. In other words, the sculpting here emerges from a pedagogical alliance between model and student.
Perhaps more important, however, is the way in which the teacher as exemplar functions to supplement "principles of the art" in Isocrates's educational scheme. Indeed, attention to the precise language preceding the passage on imitation suggests that modeling is not "teaching" at all, but rather something quite different: "The teacher must go through these aspects as precisely as possible, so that nothing teachable is left out, but as for the rest, he must offer himself as a model" ("Against the Sophists" 17). In other words, once the principles have been exhausted, there is still a remainder, a portion of the art of oratory that cannot be transferred through admirations, all hold a kind of desire-to "strive after, affect, desire emulously" (Liddell and Scott 755) . The Isocratean passage thus suggests a concomitant coveting of and agonistic striving after qualities embodied in an expert practitioner of the art at hand: repetition cannot be easily separated from response.
Perhaps more important, however, is the way in which the teacher as exemplar functions to supplement "principles of the art" in Isocrates's educational scheme. Indeed, attention to the precise language preceding the passage on imitation suggests that modeling is not "teaching" at all, but rather something quite different: "The teacher must go through these aspects as precisely as possible, so that nothing teachable is left out, but as for the rest, he must offer himself as a model" ("Against the Sophists" 17). In other words, once the principles have been exhausted, there is still a remainder, a portion of the art of oratory that cannot be transferred through explicit discussion of composition, arrangement, and style (16). This remainder enables students of philosophy to achieve "the perfect disposition" (teleios hexousin) harks back to kairos, the time of action, and also at the same time has to do with manner, an almost unarticulable style and grace that can be observed and emulated but not rendered into precepts.
Nonetheless, the ability to achieve this degree of perfection depends on the constant repetition of a certain hexis, here described as a degree of "grace and charm." In other words, the "end result" of such pedagogy is not a finished product, but a dispositional capacity for iteration-the ability to continually repeat, transform, and respond.
"A CALISTHENICS OF MANHOOD"
The development of such a capacity for iteration began early, with deportment training and exercises for young boys (Freeman 129). In the archaic and early classical periods, training in deportment took on a bodily manner with attention to selfpresentation, bodily carriage, standing, sitting, and walking. As Maud W. Gleason notes in her study of later sophists, such a focus on the corporeal elements of deportment was central to the production of masculinity in antiquity. It was here, in these youthful exercises, that what Gleason calls "the cultivation of manliness" found its beginnings. As Gleason puts it, "Deportment matters. It is a shorthand that encodes, and replicates, the complex realities of social structure, in a magnificent economy of voice and gesture" (xxiv). Gleason's consideration of the second century AD's treatment of deportment in rhetorical training might be elucidated historically through a consideration of archaic and classical deportment training that took place in the realm of gymnastics, under the watchful eye of the gymnastic trainer. In this light, her observation that "[r]hetoric was a calisthenics of manhood" (xxii) takes on a more literal force. Indeed, bodily comportment was an abiding concern for ancient educators. Aristophanes's Clouds provides some insight into the fastidious attention to such practices under the "old education," as the character Kreitton articulates the relationship between behaving oneself and managing one's body: "Then in the gymnasium, when they sat down, they were expected to keep their legs well up" (966). This passage suggests a double force of manner: the politic, behavioral force, where one learned to repeat polite actions, and the way in which that behavior was linked to particular styles of moving: a manner of walking, speaking, acting.
This early emphasis on manner and movement carries through all phases of rhetorical and athletic training, as evidenced in the Isocratean passage above in which he invokes the perfect disposition in regards to rhetoric, and also in Aeschines's explicit discussion of composition, arrangement, and style (16). This remainder enables students of philosophy to achieve "the perfect disposition" (teleios hexousin) harks back to kairos, the time of action, and also at the same time has to do with manner, an almost unarticulable style and grace that can be observed and emulated but not rendered into precepts.
This early emphasis on manner and movement carries through all phases of rhetorical and athletic training, as evidenced in the Isocratean passage above in which he invokes the perfect disposition in regards to rhetoric, and also in Aeschines If we were boxers, for a great many days before the contest we should have been learning how to fight, and working hard, practicing in mimicry all those methods we meant to employ on the day we should be fighting for victory, and imitating (mimoumenoi) the real thing as nearly as possible: thus, we should don padded gloves instead of proper ring-gloves, so as to get the best possible practice in giving blows and dodging them; and if we chanced to be very short of training-mates, do you suppose that we would be deterred by fear of the laughter of fools from hanging up a lifeless dummy and practicing on it? Indeed, if ever we were in a desert, and without either live or lifeless training-mates, would we not have recourse to shadow-fighting If, as Cicero says, the body talks through action-habituated action-then body reading, or the encounter with these actions, emerges as an important (and necessary) effect of such repetition. Such repetition, always in relation to the particular temporal and spatial situation, is therefore productive, insofar as it shapes reading practices and the imitative, repetitive practices that emerge as reading provoke desire for sunousia, for transformation by association.
All styles of repetition, because they are particular to time, space, and the singular cluster of forces enacting them, emerge in response to specific forces: to opponents, and to values, beliefs, and practices that shape and are shaped by the differential, emergent repetition. In short, repetition in sophistic-style rhetorical training is always bound up with responsiveness within particular contexts. Early rhetorical training and performance are thus tightly linked to a kind of bodily reading practice elaborated by Aristotle in his version of the healthy man walking. In other words, repetition inhabits rhetorical training from several directions. First, the desirable qualities-deportment, carriage, bodily movement-are picked up and repeated via constant association. Also through association one acquires a habit of "body reading," of perceiving desirable qualities and their concomitant values.
If, as Cicero says, the body talks through action-habituated action-then body reading, or the encounter with these actions, emerges as an important (and necessary) effect of such repetition. Such repetition, always in relation to the particular temporal and spatial situation, is therefore productive, insofar as it shapes reading practices and the imitative, repetitive practices that emerge as reading provoke desire for sunousia, for transformation by association.
All styles of repetition, because they are particular to time, space, and the singular cluster of forces enacting them, emerge in response to specific forces: to opponents, and to values, beliefs, and practices that shape and are shaped by the differential, emergent repetition. In short, repetition in sophistic-style rhetorical training is always bound up with responsiveness within particular contexts. As in many treatments of citizen training considered so far, this passage suggests that only the agon can prepare one fully for the agon, as evidenced by the question posed before this passage: "Suppose we had been rearing boxers or pancratiasts or competitors in any similar branch of athletics, should we have gone straight into the contest without previously engaging in daily combat with someone?"(8 3 a-b). Here daily combat provides the repetition necessary for learning, and cheironomia exemplifies the role of agonism in training: even the self can be the other in agonistic preparation. Furthermore, the passage suggests the way in which cheironomein, in addition to being a practice of productive repetition, is also a mode of imitation by which one approximates the agonistic situation, rehearsing previously observed bodily moves and gestures in an imagined context. For Plato's Athenian stranger, the athlete provides a useful model for citizens in training insofar as he makes use of any available means of agonistic engagement.
Early rhetorical training and performance are thus tightly linked to a kind of bodily reading practice elaborated by Aristotle in his version of the healthy man walking. In other words, repetition inhabits rhetorical training from several directions. First, the desirable qualities-deportment, carriage, bodily movement-are picked up and repeated via constant association. Also through association one acquires a habit of "body reading," of perceiving desirable qualities and their concomitant values.
All styles of repetition, because they are particular to time, space, and the singular cluster of forces enacting them, emerge in response to specific forces: to opponents, and to values, beliefs, and practices that shape and are shaped by the differential, emergent repetition. In short, repetition in sophistic-style rhetorical training is always bound up with responsiveness within particular contexts. Both Sirc's and Muckelbauer's theories of writing and reading, not unlike the three Rs delineated here, contest the notion of a subject in both senses of the word. First, Pollock-style composition cannot begin until the inhabiting begins-that is, until the "subject" (read: artist/writer) "gets lost" in the painting, what Sirc refers to as a kind of "exscription" (15). Similarly, Muckelbauer's delineation of a Foucauldian reading practice would ask that a "reader" submit to a text-its terms, its styles, its movements-as a way of taking it seriously. Perhaps productive reading is a contemporary instantiation of what I have been calling "associative pedagogy," which entails active, responsive submission. Second, the academic subject, be it composition or literature or literary theory, becomes more contested. Since ancient rhetorical performance and its concomitant training practices both took place at the level of the body, the focus lies on an attention to manner-to the way in which one acquires artistic expertise-over matter, here meaning subject matter, as in the modern notion of the three Rs.
That is, rather than focusing on material learned-the sophists didn't have a curriculum in the modern sense of a "subject matter" to be "covered"-sophistic pedagogy emphasized the materiality of learning, the corporeal acquisition of rhetorical movements through rhythm, repetition, and response. This manner of learning-doing entails "getting a feel for" the work-following and producing a rhythm. The body itself becomes a sundromos, an intensive gathering of forces (of desire, of vigorous practices, of musical sounds, of corporeal codes), trafficked through and by neurons, muscles, and organs. Entwined with the body in this way, rhetorical training thus exceeds the transmission of "ideas," rhetoric the bounds of "words." Both Sirc's and Muckelbauer's theories of writing and reading, not unlike the three Rs delineated here, contest the notion of a subject in both senses of the word. First, Pollock-style composition cannot begin until the inhabiting begins-that is, until the "subject" (read: artist/writer) "gets lost" in the painting, what Sirc refers to as a kind of "exscription" (15). Similarly, Muckelbauer's delineation of a Foucauldian reading practice would ask that a "reader" submit to a text-its terms, its styles, its movements-as a way of taking it seriously. Perhaps productive reading is a contemporary instantiation of what I have been calling "associative pedagogy," which entails active, responsive submission. Second, the academic subject, be it composition or literature or literary theory, becomes more contested. Since ancient rhetorical performance and its concomitant training practices both took place at the level of the body, the focus lies on an attention to manner-to the way in which one acquires artistic expertise-over matter, here meaning subject matter, as in the modern notion of the three Rs.
That is, rather than focusing on material learned-the sophists didn't have a curriculum in the modern sense of a "subject matter" to be "covered"-sophistic pedagogy emphasized the materiality of learning, the corporeal acquisition of rhetorical movements through rhythm, repetition, and response. This manner of learning-doing entails "getting a feel for" the work-following and producing a rhythm. The body itself becomes a sundromos, an intensive gathering of forces (of desire, of vigorous practices, of musical sounds, of corporeal codes), trafficked through and by neurons, muscles, and organs. Entwined with the body in this way, rhetorical training thus exceeds the transmission of "ideas," rhetoric the bounds of "words." 
